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IN TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY BRITAIN: 
TRADITION AND POINTS OF DEPARTURE,  
AND THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE CONSCIOUS PAST 
 
Gary Wilson and Sarah Wilson1 
Abstract 
The Financial Services (Banking Reform) Bill 2013/14 (hereafter Banking Reform Bill) is set 
to introduce a new criminal offence of reckless misconduct by senior bank staff. The 
introduction of such an offence was recommended in the Final Report of the Parliamentary 
Commission on Banking Standards (PCBS) Changing Banking for Good, published 19 June 
2013; as part of a ‘package of recommendations to raise standards’. 2  This particular 
recommendation had been widely anticipated. A short time before this Report, the PCBS 
Chair, Andrew Tyrie MP, had bemoaned the lack of ‘orange jumpsuits’ being donned by 
bankers.3 Equally, press reportage that ‘reckless bankers’ could ‘face jail’ had started to 
appear from as early as the close of 2011. 4  Government endorsement of the PCBS 
recommendations followed quickly from the publication of the latter’s report. On 8 July 2013 
the Government Response to the Report to this effect signalled that this would be achieved 
by adding amendments to the Banking Reform Bill 2013/14, first introduced in Parliament 4 
February 2013. This has now transpired, by virtue of amendments to the Bill introduced on 9 
October 2013. Like the initial PCBS recommendation, government support for the new 
criminal offence was also widely anticipated. Government favour for such a measure had 
been strongly signalled in the Treasury Consultation Sanctions for the Directors of Failed 
Banks, published in July 2012. 5  It had been signposted earlier still by very public 
declarations of support from Matthew Hancock, MP, a close ally of George Osborne, the 
Chancellor of the Exchequer.6  
 
At one level, this new criminal offence is intended to be very narrow in application, and 
enforced only very exceptionally. In other respects, analysis of it through the current 
proposals7show it to be a manifestly important measure which will alter the longstanding 
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course of criminal liability for ‘financial sector’ crime in Britain.8 It is also part of the discourse 
of the post-crisis regulatory environment encouraging reflection on the past in configuring 
responses for the future; including suggestions that too little attention has been paid to 
‘lessons of history’.9 In exploring aspects of both these distinctive angles, attention is paid to 
how nineteenth-century responses were themselves informed by contemporary Victorian 
understanding of a ‘conscious past’. Little work has been undertaken on how Victorian 
responses to financial crime were influenced by a conscious past and the article considers 
why the introduction of the reckless conduct in banking offence creates such an appropriate 
juncture for doing so. This is in the light of our own awareness of how criminal law has 
responded to financial misconduct for over 150 years, and what new approaches might be 
required to respond to the regulatory challenges of the early twenty-first century.  
 
Keywords: Banking sector reform, criminal liability for misconduct in banking, financial 
sector crime, criminal law, history and the Victorian legacy.  
Introduction  
‘Financial meltdown’ and the contextual origins of the ‘reckless banking offence’ 
The origins of the offence of reckless conduct by senior bank staff (or, as it can be found 
informally termed, the ‘reckless banking offence’) lie in the global ‘financial meltdown’ of 
2007-8.10 This is widely regarded as having arrived in Britain on 14 September 2007. It 
followed from BBC reports the previous day that the North-East lending giant, Northern 
Rock, had sought emergency financial support from the Bank of England. As early as 7am 
on 14 September, long queues became visible outside the lender’s branches and its 
telephone switchboard and online facilities became jammed. As the subsequent Treasury 
Select Committee Report on the failure of Northern Rock explained, Northern Rock’s highly 
risky business model which was ‘excessively reliant on wholesale funding’, was both 
regarded as being symptomatic of wide-spread debt finance practices, and would also 
ensure that the institution could not avoid becoming caught up in the global squeeze on 
credit which started to solidify during the summer of 2007.11 Becoming known as the ‘credit 
crunch’, this had its own origins in the US sub-prime mortgage crisis, commencing with cuts 
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in interest rates during 2001-3, pursued by then Chairman of the Federal Reserve, Alan 
Greenspan, in response to concerns about economic downturn.  
 
Greenspan’s strategy had led to lending institutions targeting mortgage provision to low 
income households in a setting where much encouragement was given to this politically, and 
where the relaxation of the traditional financial and structural thresholds entailed in home 
purchasing were cast aside. This encouraged lending activity, bolstered by belief that house 
price rises would continue to accelerate. This, in turn, was emboldened by patterns of growth 
from the early part of the decade and long-term patterns showing no national price fall since 
the Depression years of the 1930s. As lenders embarked on their zealous pursuit of this low 
income market, investment bankers started to purchase these mortgages from them and 
package them into debt-based investment instruments/vehicles. These were modelled on 
patterns of mortgage default rates as well as historic house price patterns. In spring 2007 
reports of significant losses started to hit US investment banking, and its ‘spill over’ effect 
became manifested in Libor rates confirming banks’ reluctance to lend to one another.12 This 
prompted the European Central Bank to pump 94 billion euros of liquidity into the European 
banking system. Subsequently, Mervyn King, then Governor of the Bank of England, insisted 
that ‘lender of last resort’ assistance would be made to any bank experiencing short-term 
difficulties from what then appeared to be extreme, but short-lived conditions.13   
 
Northern Rock’s difficulties derived from two factors. First, how it had come about that by the 
end of 2006, 89.2% of its assets were located in residential mortgages. Second, how it was 
that its continuing expansion of mortgage activity was achieved largely through wholesale 
borrowing combined with securitisation or ‘packaging’ of mortgages as collateral for further 
funds. This course was pursued whilst Northern Rock sought to diversify its assets through 
expanding its overseas market-base, but without foreseeing that once markets in mortgage-
backed securities had closed, it would be left ‘absolutely unable to finance...wholly illiquid 
assets’.14  Subsequently, the Treasury Select Committee criticised both Northern Rock’s 
‘fatally flawed’ business model of using wholesale funding to achieve continuing growth in 
the mortgage market, and also the then City watchdog, the Financial Services Authority 
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(FSA) for systematically failing in its regulatory duty ‘to ensure that Northern Rock would not 
pose a systemic risk’.15  
 
Criticisms of banking intensified following Northern Rock’s demise. These criticisms focused 
particularly on the way in which a number of institutions became identified with the lexicon of 
being ‘too big to fail’ on account of being considered a ‘systemical institution’:16 an institution 
whose failure would pose a threat to the overall stability of the financial system underpinning 
the whole economy.17 Partial public ownership would follow for institutions including Northern 
Rock and the Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS), and would narrowly be avoided for others such 
as Halifax Bank of Scotland (HBOS). The difficulties experienced by these institutions would 
also influence a further lexicon of the global ‘financial meltdown’ of the early twenty-first 
century; that of ‘socially useless banking’. 
 
1 Current Concerns and Signposting the Significance of a ‘Conscious 
Past’ 
As originally conceived by Lord Adair Turner, when FSA Chairman, ‘socially useless 
banking’ sought to describe institutions which had become too swollen and too focused on 
profit-making to be beneficial for society.18 Lord Turner did subsequently qualify this as being 
intended to provoke debate on banks’ importance to the achieving of benefits for the real 
economy and thus human welfare; thereby revising his criticism as being of ‘economically 
useless’ banking.19 However, this was a very public rebuke to banking practices. It was also 
one which became indicative of the very strong identification of the financial crisis with 
banking malpractice, and of actual misconduct by individual bankers. Following the crisis, 
bankers would be forced to claim that the sector had engaged in a period of ‘remorse and 
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apology’.20 There would be concerns about how quickly banking appeared to be rehabilitated 
following this, largely channelled through reportage of how investment banking once again 
started to generate huge rewards.21 This did not sit comfortably with how regulators sought 
to refute claims that opportunities to seek real and lasting reform of the banking sector were 
not being taken seriously in policy circles, and to insist instead that the ‘once-in-a-lifetime’ 
crisis would generate the new regulatory directions required in its aftermath.22  
 
In this vein, official reports on RBS in 2011 and HBOS in 2013 echoed closely the direction 
of the 2007 scrutinising of Northern Rock. In 2012, Fred Goodwin, the RBS former CEO, 
was stripped of his knighthood: and a year earlier, the FSA Board had issued a damning 
verdict on RBS and its ‘extremely risky’ practices, as well as on the apparent legal lacuna 
exposed by the institution’s failure. 23 The verdict included the point that it appeared, from the 
fact that no individual had been found legally responsible for the failure , that ‘action cannot 
be taken under existing rules’. If this was so, then surely rules for the future had to be 
changed.24  
 
The Treasury Select Committee Report on Northern Rock had also signalled a further 
dimension to regulators’ interest in securing appropriate levels of reform in the light of the 
crisis. In the very midst of the crisis, it had been remarked that ‘the most notorious bank run 
in British history took place in May 1866 at the time of the collapse of Overend, Gurney and 
Co’.25 This had been presented very much as a lesson in the causes and consequences of 
systemic failure.26 The extent of regulators’ regard for history in their search for responses 
for the future is unclear, and they do not acknowledge the intellectual debates attached to 
history’s possible applications for the present and future.27 But references to history and 
allusions to the importance of being ‘historically aware’ as new directions are being 
configured have continued. Mervyn King’s reference in 2012 to how more attention needed 
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to have been paid to the ‘lessons of history’ in the lead up to the events of 2007 provides 
what is, in many ways, an iconic illustration of this.28 Sometime earlier, post-crisis reflections 
from the FSA included reactions of Susan Dewar (then Head of Wholesale) critiquing the 
Hegelian adage that ‘if history teaches us one thing, it’s that history teaches us nothing’.29 
Although clearly bruised from the failure of Northern Rock and from the stinging criticism it 
received at the hands of the Treasury Select Committee in 2007, the then City regulator’s 
regard for the past and its significance had marked similarity with the 2007 Report. Ms 
Dewar insisted that whilst the cyclical nature of scandals would continue ‘to rock the financial 
system to its very core’ it is vital to try to learn from the past.30 These reflections from 
regulators, however such figures regard history intellectually, are ones encouraging 
engagement with a conscious past as attention is paid to mapping out future directions.  
 
For the significance of this to become more readily apparent there is a requirement to return, 
initially, to the official reports generated by troubled banks following the crisis. That which 
reflected on the difficulties experienced by HBOS was conducted under the auspices of the 
PCBS, and published in April 2013.31 The PCBS’s findings of ‘colossal failure of senior 
management and the Board’ were couched in explanations that whilst HBOS had avoided 
partial public ownership, this was only on account of its purchase by Lloyds Banking Group 
and taxpayer assistance.32 It was found that HBOS had avoided actual financial failure in 
spite of its executives being incapable even of understanding – let alone managing – the 
risks of aspects of its investment business. The PCBS had concluded that this ensured the 
institution’s downfall was an ‘accident waiting to happen’.33 But this report will probably be 
best remembered for the full-frontal attack on three HBOS executives, serving to illustrate 
the PCBS’s contention that anyone presiding over ‘downfall’ of this magnitude should be 
barred from again holding a position in any regulated entity within the financial sector.34 The 
personal attack on these three named executives resulted in Business Secretary Vince 
Cable being tasked with investigating whether disqualification proceedings could be 
pursued.35 This very public reckoning for the HBOS executives led its former CEO Sir James 
Crosbie to ‘hand in’ his knighthood in April 2013. It is also significant for a further reason; 
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one which relates more directly to this article. It took place as the PCBS was working 
towards its final report, having earlier (in December 2012) invited views on numerous 
proposed changes to the regulation of the UK banking system, including ‘how the law, 
including criminal…sanctions, applies to banks and bankers’.36 
 
2 New Criminal Liability: Initial Stimulus and Concretisation 
The PCBS had itself been appointed in July 2012 in the wake of the Libor-fixing revelations. 
Appearing in June 2013, these revelations re-centred ‘banker blame’ for the crisis, following 
a period of some anxiety about just how quickly banking appeared to resume ‘business as 
usual’.37 This all cast further doubt on the sincerity of the banking community’s claims that it 
had understood that the crisis had undermined public trust in it, and that rebuilding this 
would require bankers becoming ‘better citizens’.38 The remit of the PCBS was to consider 
and report on the ‘professional standards and culture of the UK banking sector…and to 
make recommendations for legislative and other action’. 39  This intervention had been 
necessitated by revelations of how the Libor scandal, alongside those associated with 
Payment Protection Insurance (PPI) and interest rate swap mis-selling, had demonstrated ‘a 
widespread failure of competence in the banking industry’ and also ‘a failure of 
professionalism and ethics’.40  
 
The recommendations ultimately made by the PCBS in 2013 were grouped thematically 
under four broad headings. It was under the heading of ‘strengthening individual 
accountability’ that the creation of a new criminal offence of reckless misconduct for senior 
bankers was located.41 In accepting this recommendation, the  government identified how 
this would subsist as part of a package of initiatives. Those would cluster around a tough 
new ‘Senior Persons’ regime for governing the behaviour of senior bank staff, within a 
setting where it would become more difficult for bank bosses to avoid liability for breaches 
occurring within their areas of responsibility. This was together with the introduction of 
banking standards rules for all bank staff, in order to promote higher standards across this 
community.42  
                                                          
36
 PCBS, First Report of Session 2012–13, HL Paper 98, HC 848, December 2012, p. 7, with other 
key matters for the Commission’s concern identified as ‘How banks compete…run 
themselves…[and]…are supervised and regulated’, pp.7;10. 
37
 See Williams, ‘Time for us to challenge’.  
38
 Bob Diamond, Inaugural Today Business Lecture, BBC Hose, London, 3 November 2011. 
39
 See http://www.parliament.uk/bankingstandards [accessed 17 November 2013]. 
40
 Government Response to the Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards (hereafter, 
Government Response to PCBS), Cm 8661, London, 8 July 2013, paras1.3; 1.5.  
41
 Ibid, para.1.5, with the other three headings identified as reforming corporate governance; securing 
better outcomes for consumers through enhanced competition; and enhancing financial stability.  
42
 Ibid, para.1.6; 1.54.  
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Prior to the publication of the PCBS’s final report, the Libor scandal had already precipitated 
new criminal law in England and Wales, through s.91 of the Financial Services Act 2012. 
This legislation had brought the ‘twin peaks’ regulatory regime formally into existence, 
through the inception of the Prudential Regulation and Financial Conduct Authorities (PRA 
and FCA respectively) to replace the FSA.43 The 2012 Act also relocated and extended 
liability for ‘criminal market abuse’.44 This was formerly located in s.397 of the Financial 
Services and Markets Act (FSMA) 2000.45 However, the 2012 Act, under s.91, created a 
new criminal offence of manipulation of ‘benchmarks’.46 As far as the ‘reckless banking’ 
offence is concerned, whilst recommendation for it did ultimately come from the PCBS,  
government interest in such an initiative was of longer standing. It had formally first been 
publicised in 2012, in the Treasury Consultation Sanctions for Directors of Failed Banks. The 
Treasury set out in this a  government intention to ensure that ‘bank directors and senior 
management take full account of the downside risks for their institutions’ in furtherance of its 
undertaking to reform banks and to reduce ‘risks to the economy and the taxpayer’.47 The 
Treasury Consultation also insisted that the FSA Report on the failure of RBS had been 
significant in this regard. It was noted that at one level, this Report had been focused on 
‘regulatory sanctions and measures’ in redressing ‘currently absent’ liability for executives 
and Board members for ‘the adverse consequences of poor decisions’.48 However, it had 
also ‘stimulated interest in the possibility of new criminal sanctions for misconduct in bank 
management as a further way of shifting the balance between risk and reward for bank 
directors’.49 The RBS Report dating from December 2011 had, of course, been published 
some time earlier than the PCBS’s castigation of HBOS. Thus by late 2012, proposals for 
extending criminal liability were already on the PCBS’s agenda. But the Treasury 
Consultation also made a much more important point for this article’s interest in future 
directions and a conscious past.  
 
 
                                                          
43
 See for example, Hector Sants, ‘Delivering “twin peaks” within the FSA’, Speech, British Bankers’ 
Association Briefing, London, 6 February 2012, at 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/*/http:/www.fsa.gov.uk/. [accessed 17 November 2013]. 
44
 As commonly referenced by the FSA during its lifetime. See for example, Notice, “FSA secures 
convictions in first criminal market abuse case”, /PN/091/2005 18 August 2005, at 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/*/http:/www.fsa.gov.uk/ [accessed 17 November 2013]. 
45
 By virtue of ss 89 and 90 of the Financial Services Act 2012. 
46
 With the origins of this being the Wheatley Review: see Martin Wheatley, The Wheatley Review of 
LIBOR – Final Report (London: HM Treasury, 28 September 2012) at http://cdn.hm-
treasury.gov.uk/wheatley_review_libor_finalreport_280912.pdf [accessed 17 November 2013]. 
47
 Treasury Consultation, para.1.5. 
48
 RBS Report, p.9. 
49
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3 Established Criminal Liability, New Directions and the Conscious Past 
In identifying government interest in new criminal liability sanctions for ‘serious misconduct in 
the management of a bank’, the Treasury Consultation acknowledged that such a 
development would entail crafting an offence which ‘would not necessarily involve any 
element of dishonesty when it is committed’. As such, it would raise a number of complex 
issues in its introduction and even in its formulation. 50  The Consultation continued to 
illuminate this by explaining that whilst the criminal law had enjoyed a lengthy and important 
role in ‘providing a sanction for improper behaviour in the financial services sphere’, such 
offences as existed did not ‘cover matters such as negligence, incompetence or 
recklessness or other forms of purely managerial misconduct’. 51  This was illustrated by 
reference to fraud and related ‘dishonesty’ offences and to insider dealing and making 
misleading statements. The offence of fraud under the Fraud Act 2006, and others located 
within that legislation, embodied the long-standing requirement of proof of dishonesty for 
criminal liability to arise. In similar vein, insider dealing and ‘criminal market abuse’ are 
regarded as very serious criminal offences where the predominant requirement is for 
misconduct to be intentional/deliberate for liability to arise.52 With the influencing forces of 
RBS readily apparent, the Consultation explained that any such new criminal liability would 
be attached to institutional failure, and would arise only in this setting.  
 
From this, the Consultation identified four possible ways in which this liability could be 
framed.53 In doing so it also assessed the relative merits of strict liability arising automatically 
by being a director of an institution which fails; negligence where liability follows from failure 
in a duty of care resulting in a reasonably foreseeable outcome; incompetence, from the 
failure to follow professional practices/standards; and recklessness where liability embodies 
failure to have sufficient regard for the dangers posed to the safety and soundness of the 
firm concerned or for the possibility that there were such dangers. 54  In signalling  
government preference for recklessness, the Consultation identified the desirability of fault-
based liability, because whilst strict liability was likely to be a strong incentive to failure-
avoidance, imposing severe criminal penalties on individuals who were not plainly at fault 
                                                          
50
 Ibid.  
51
 Ibid. 
52
 See Michael Ashe and Lynne Counsel, Insider Trading (London: Tolley, 1993), pp.71-2; Margaret 
Cole, Speech, Introduction to the FSA Enforcement Conference, London, 22 June 2010, at 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/*/http:/www.fsa.gov.uk/ [17 November 2013]. Cole was then 
FSA Director of Enforcement. But it is here noted that acts of market abuse can be committed 
recklessly courtesy of offences now located in ss.89 and 90 of the Financial Services Act 2012 where 
the thrust of these offences is strongly that of conduct which is intentional/dishonest. 
53
 Treasury Consultation, para.4.3. 
54
 Ibid.  
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would be controversial. 55  Furthermore, the ‘egregious character of recklessness’, would 
surely ‘at the very least...make bank directors think twice before taking certain decisions’.56 
But the Consultation also explained that criminal liability which could be established from 
banking conduct falling short of being deliberate/intentional presented problems. This was so 
given that banking inherently and unavoidably involves taking risks, with much of this 
premised on how investment decision-making was forward-looking and judgement-based, 
rather than involving the application of exact science. 57  In identifying how ‘defining 
recklessness or excessive risk taking by bank management requires a clear idea of what 
would constitute normal or non-excessive risk taking’ the Consultation made some attempt 
to interface with the necessity of risk-taking for economic and societal well-being, but this 
was tacit at best, and largely unspoken.58  
 
This formed part of the Consultation’s presentation of the key issues arising which both 
acknowledged that the criminal law had a lengthy and important tradition in sanctioning 
financial sector misconduct, and also that its use in this context had an equally noteworthy 
tradition of being difficult to apply. Banking, and particularly that engaging directly with risk-
taking (like much complex financial transactional activity), was likely to involve a number of 
different elements occurring over a period of time, making difficult any process establishing 
both the persons responsible and the causation.59 This thereby ensured that investigations 
and prosecutions would be both time-consuming and very costly.60 The task of ‘assembling 
evidence’ would thus be a huge undertaking, in the light of the size and complexity of the 
financial institutions concerned, and the prosecutorial obligations flowing from the Code for 
Crown Prosecutors. From this it could be expected that such investigations and prosecutions 
would run into years rather than months.61 However, the Consultation’s observation that the 
existence of such liability was likely to make bank officers ‘think twice’ in making decisions 
provided early indication that any such liability introduced was likely to be narrowly drawn 
and enforced only very exceptionally. It was always ever going to arise in the context of 
institutional failure. The government, in responding to the PCBS recommendation for such 
an offence, has clarified that liability would only ever apply to senior executives, by aligning it 
specifically with the introduction of a new Senior Persons regulatory regime.62 That it is 
                                                          
55
 Ibid para.4.4. 
56
 Ibid, paras.4.4; 4.1.1.  
57
 Ibid, para.4.12. 
58
 Ibid. 
59
 Ibid, para.4.15. 
60
 Ibid, para.4.17.  
61
 Ibid. 
62
 Government Response to PCBS, paras.1.6; 2.13-2.16; also the Banking Reform Bill 2013/14, 
Government Amendments: Senior Managers and Banking Standards, 9 October 2013. 
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intended to be enforced only exceptionally has also long been apparent from strong 
intimation in government circles that the value of this initiative attaches to the ‘the shadow of 
prosecution’ cast over those entrusted with institutions of ‘vital national importance’.63 
 
4 Financial Misconduct and Attacks on Victorian Economic and Wider 
Societal Interests  
The importance of new criminal liability being a mechanism for deterring excessive risk-
taking with a view to changing ‘the culture of finance so it is safer for us all’ does suggest the 
‘reckless banking offence’ may not be such a marked departure from the UK legal tradition 
for applying criminal law to financial sector misconduct in practice.64 But it is a marked new 
conceptual direction, where there is an acknowledged longstanding tradition of requiring 
dishonesty or misconduct which is intentional /deliberate for applying criminal law. It is also 
the case that the tradition which is acknowledged in the Treasury Consultation is actually 
part of one of significant length in standing, and dates back over 150 years. This appears to 
have been a very conscious choice made by the society which discovered ‘large-scale 
illegality that occurs in the world of finance and financial institutions’ during the 1840s.65 
Elsewhere it is argued that the historical foundations of much of the substantive and 
institutional legal machinery that is in place to fight financial crime today descends from the 
‘inauguration, development, and rapid progress’ of ‘High Art’ crime. 66 Even the Victorians 
termed this ‘financial crime’.67 There is much convincing contemporary evidence that this 
phenomenon solidified contemporary perceptions that some financial misconduct 
necessitated redress which was different from wrongdoing which could be put right by 
making good ‘out of [one’s] own property’.68 Instead of such restitution, what was required 
was enforcement through processes traditionally underpinned by a communal rejection of 
wrong-doing.69 
 
In recognising that a number of its social and economic interests were being assailed by 
serious harm arising from financial misconduct, Victorian society’s reactions were clear and 
dramatic. By the 1850s legislation sought specifically to target a number of financial or 
financially-oriented infractions, with the criminal cause celebre trials also emerging during 
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this decade appearing to have many resemblances with criminal trials found in the financial 
services arena today, including shared experiences of the difficulties associated with them, 
as identified by the 2012 Treasury Consultation.70 Nevertheless, for the Victorians a distinct 
pattern would emerge in determining that ‘certain activities are deemed criminal and not 
others’.71 The Victorians separated out wrongs which could be put right through financial 
reparation from others which could not be so, and in so doing, acknowledged a ‘broad 
spectrum...of actions’. 72  This included ones exhibiting ‘varying degrees of intent...and 
wrongfulness’.73 This demonstrates that that society was very clearly against criminalising 
conduct pursuant to ‘any of the ordinary transactions of trade’.74 This was notwithstanding 
contemporary appreciation that commercial transacting was not characteristically built on 
‘the strictest standards of personal morality’. 75  Criminalisation would not interfere with 
‘anything that might be wrongfully done, if it was not done with intent to defraud’.76 The 
import of these remarks made in 1857 by Sir Richard Bethell, then Attorney-General, as 
parliament debated what became the Punishment of Frauds Act 1857 is also strongly 
evident in Sir George Jessel’s retrospective reflection on the legislation in 1877.77 In this, the 
then Master of the Rolls remarked that it was incumbent on the law to ‘punish people for real 
frauds, and not make any fictitious ones’.78  
 
In 1877 Sir George Jessel had emphasised the importance of appropriately drawn up 
criminal liability for fraud to illustrate the importance of establishing the office of Public 
Prosecutor. He insisted that without such an office (eventually established in 1879) there lay 
the very real danger that important and perfectly adequate law would fall into disuse.79 This 
was because the system of private prosecution emphasised the inconvenience and 
significant expense of bringing a prosecution: a problem embodied in the sentiment that 
‘what is everybody’s business is nobody’s business’.80 Jessel MR’s remarks were directed at 
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law which required financial misconduct to be accompanied by fraudulent intent for criminal 
liability to arise, with these discourses helping to uncover how this position would be aligned 
with the better established one on fraud in civil liability. Novel criminal liability, in serving to 
distance misconduct from ‘ordinary transactions of trade’, was spoken about as arising from 
what is readily recognisable as harm inflicted on another through deliberate falsehood or that 
practiced from a lack of belief in the truth.81 It was also directly aligned with concern that if 
liability were drawn more widely, this would discourage participation from persons on whom 
entrepreneurial activity relied because they were either prepared to finance risk-taking 
activity on which the embedding of industrial capitalism depended, or prepared to engage in 
this themselves.82 This was a society very painfully aware of the fragility of the capitalist 
economy, with this being manifestly clear from the railway crisis of the 1840s and the 
‘commercial distress’ of the 1850s. The threat presented by the crisis generated from the 
railway boom to the new model of speculation central to financing the capitalist project 
clearly still haunted contemporaries as they grappled with how the latter period of financial 
instability exposed both the vulnerability of the domestic financial system, and also its 
susceptibility to external economic forces. 83  The misconduct at the heart of these two 
decades would make them ‘one of the darkest pages in the commercial history of this 
country’.84 
 
5 Economy and Society and Harm Inflicted by Non-deliberate Misconduct: 
Victorian society and its Conscious Past 
It was also a society very clearly aware of how undue tolerance of financial infractions could 
and indeed would result in ‘wide-spread ruin...scattered over the whole of the country, 
houses have been brought to destruction, families have been plunged from affluence into 
poverty, the hard earnings of industry, collected by long labour, have been entirely lost’.85 It 
had even discerned that it was ‘excessive much more than deliberately fraudulent 
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adventure which brings on commercial convulsion’: 86  In a setting where it would be 
impossible to eradicate entirely those determined to misuse business structures and a 
strong appetite for investment to gull and to cheat, it was virtually impossible to identify and 
locate ‘excessive’ or unduly risky decision-making within an otherwise lawful enterprise. In 
recognising that ‘breaches of mercantile trust’ arising in the latter setting could arise from the 
very demonstrable commitment of capitalists to the well-being of their businesses, 
criminalisation was very consciously concerned with conveying messages which were 
oppositional to any show of tolerance or ‘ill-judged sympathy’.87 Nevertheless, this was also 
a society which believed that the proper bounds for criminalising financial misconduct 
required wrongdoing which was deliberate. This is consistent with the adage used today, 
that ‘punishment should be restricted to those who have voluntarily broken the law’.88 This 
underpins the ‘moral licence’ for the administration of criminal punishment, with such 
sentiments also an evident influencing force for the rationalisation of the criminal law 
undertaken from the 1820s. 89  This was a society with a strong sense of its own 
distinctiveness from its own past.90 It is also one with which we might well identify with today 
in the early years of the twenty-first century, where the social and economic and also 
technological transformations of the ‘digital age’ have ensured we feel intense vulnerability 
as well as being aware of significant opportunity.  
 
Perhaps extending the proper bounds of criminal liability as envisioned by the ‘reckless 
banking offence’ is necessary to protect against the ‘unacceptable costs on the rest of 
society’ which the global ‘financial meltdown’ of 2007-8 revealed banking to be capable of 
inflicting. 91  Indeed, numerous commentators have reflected on how whilst some of the 
misconduct exposed from it would amount to criminal conduct under existing criminal law, 
other instances would not.92 But Victorian society was also very keenly aware of the harm to 
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economic and wider societal interests emanating from financial misconduct, including non-
deliberately inflicted harm from risk-taking. However, it had configured its criminal liability 
differently. In acknowledging the novelty of ‘high art’ crime, Victorians appreciated that 
financial misconduct was part of a ‘broad cultural pattern’; one with ‘deep historic roots’.93 In 
its consciousness of its own past, Victorian society appreciated that financial misconduct had 
subsisted within its midst since ‘time immemorial’.94 For contemporaries, the ‘high art’ crime 
which appeared during the 1840s both lay on the same broad cultural spectrum as financial 
misconduct deeply embedded in societal consciousness and memory and yet also 
represented a point of departure from what was familiar. This can be seen in narrative of 
David Morier Evans, a financial journalist for The Times. In this, Evans depicted the ‘railway 
mania’ of the 1840s as marking an entirely new alliance between dishonesty and financial 
sophistication. This was represented in classic capitalist fraud channelled through company 
promotion, and also activities beyond this showing a range of magnitude and varying 
degrees of reprehensibility.  
 
6 The 1840s: Transformative Times and an Emerging Victorian Conscious 
Past  
This was an age defined by a spectrum of financial infractions perpetrated by ‘the apprentice 
boy who robbed a few shillings from the till’ and the ‘gigantic forger or swindler’, and where 
lying between these points was the ‘reckless speculator’ who ‘would risk everything in the 
hope of sudden gain, rather than toil safely and laboriously for a distant reward’.95 In his 
account of the 1840s as a transformative time, Evans explained that alongside their shared 
rationale in financial impropriety, all such activities had benefitted from how temptations to 
crime had become ‘infinitely multiplied’ whilst impediments had been ‘reduced to a 
minimum’. This had allowed ‘high art’ crime to become increasingly commonplace.96 Evans’ 
reflection on ‘time immemorial’ was attached to embezzlement specifically, but elsewhere his 
introduction to the novelty of ‘high art’ crime reminds readers that forgery had been a notable 
foe for eighteenth-century society.97 His assessment of the duality of Victorian appreciation 
of financial misconduct in its pre-industrial past, and its belief that the 1840s marked 
something genuinely novel, also included an incidence which into the closing years of the 
twentieth century continued to attract accolades of being the ‘best known’ British fraud 
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ever.98 In looking firstly at why Victorian familiarity with embezzlement might have been so 
profound (notwithstanding Evans’ references to its associations with ‘time immemorial’), 
criminalisation of embezzlement as misappropriating property entrusted by another and 
punishable by up to 14 years’ transportation, had nineteenth rather than eighteenth-century 
origins. 99  As John Styles’ respected work reveals, the illegality embodied in legal 
understandings of embezzlement prior to the nineteenth century was quite different from ‘the 
violation of a private financial trust’ which emerged during this later time.100  
 
These earlier understandings of embezzlement had denoted an employee’s unauthorised 
appropriation of his employer’s goods.101 Such unlawfulness had thrived during pre- and 
early industrial Britain, on account of a ‘multitude of opportunities for workpeople to defraud 
their employer with a good chance of escaping detection’.102 It was the absence of direct 
supervision characterising this mode of production that proved to be capable of generating 
very considerable losses for employers.103 The financial implications for employers could be 
substantial, and the variety of pilfering possible also extensive. 104  Notwithstanding that 
embezzlement and associated frauds were both ‘illegal and actively condemned by 
employers’, mapping this onto ‘criminality’ and enforcement was highly complex. 105 
Ostensibly, legislation passed in 1749 so that ‘what had previously been treated as a breach 
of contract was made a criminal offence’ should have served to manage this path to 
criminalisation. The realities were commonly more intricate. It was not categorically the case 
that the relationship between an outworker and his employer was actually contractual, 
notwithstanding this is how it was often described.106 Furthermore, although the term ‘crime’ 
was widely used in eighteenth-century discourses, it did not have a very precise meaning, 
particularly in the context of summary offences. 107  From this Styles contended that 
historians’ emphasis on a decisive shift towards criminalisation and ‘a once-and-for-all 
transition at law from restitution to punishment’ has been misplaced.108  
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Instead Styles encourages a view of criminalisation which was much looser and rather 
signalled a more general shift in enforcement practices from financial forfeiture to physical 
punishment. This was explained through evidence pointing to continuing practices of 
requiring outworkers who received an employer’s goods in this way to make financial 
recompense notwithstanding the ‘formal’ distinction drawn in the Act between this and 
punishment.109 Although false reeling became the most prosecuted of all embezzlement 
offences in the last quarter of the eighteenth century, and further legislation had created a 
range of ‘catch-all’ offences for mere possession of suspicious materials, the difficulty in 
identifying embezzled materials remained manifest.110 But Styles also noted that attitudes 
towards enforcement through prosecution varied.111 He explained how responses became 
concentrated on a number of extra-legal ‘adjustments’ made within the employment 
relationship, which were commonly substituted for seeking recourse to law. 112  Styles’ 
explanation that the meaning given to embezzlement changed during the nineteenth century 
is very clear and apparent in the parliamentary debates dating from the 1850s relating to 
criminal liability of a number of professionals who would encounter property belonging to 
others alongside those acting as trustees under settlements of property. 113  Those who 
differed from Styles’ outworker class by virtue of being in positions of responsibility had 
always abused these positions, and incurred liability for such violations involving making 
good a wrong committed ‘out of [their] own property’. In the 1850s there was recognition that 
the new operating context of the ‘enterprise economy’ had drawn unwelcome attention to 
how ‘great facilities were afforded by the laws of this country’ for the improper application of 
property belonging to others.114  
 
Elsewhere, within the broad parameters of the eighteenth century (and as part of a spectrum 
of wrong-doing), where Styles’ pilfering outworkers caused significant hardship to the 
industries in which they operated, forgery was a capital crime throughout. It remained so 
until the early years of the nineteenth century.115 Throughout the eighteenth century, and 
often in marked contrast with employer recourse to law in the case of embezzlement, 
Andrew and McGowen explain that forgery was actually an offence which was ‘regularly 
                                                          
109
 Ibid, pp.191-2. This mirrored closely longstanding informal practices of requiring those who could 
to make financial recompense, and finding ‘other ways’ of dealing with those who could not, thereby 
drawing distinctions of the socio-economic status of an outworker 
110
 Ibid, p.194; Courtesy of the Wool Act 1774 and General Act 1777. 
111
 Ibid, pp.194; 187. 
112
 Ibid, pp.182-5. This explains the extensive range of such ‘adjustments’. 
113
 As set out in parliamentary debates on legislation which became known as the Punishment of 
Frauds Act 1857. 
114
 Hansard, series 3, 146, HC 8 June 1857, Serjeant Kinglake, col.1363.  
115
 Donna Andrew and Randall McGowen The Perreaus and Mrs Rudd: Forgery and Betrayal in the 
Eighteenth Century (California: University of California Press 2001) pp.22-30.  
Law, Crime and History (2013) 3 
 
18 
 
pronounced’ as ‘one of the most dangerous threats to the life of a commercial nation’.116 
Almost three-quarters of a century prior to the 1840s, in 1775 contemporary reflection on 
forgery was that ‘though it is not half a century since forgery was rendered a capital offence 
…even with the gallows before their eyes, forgers abound more than ever’. 117  It would 
perhaps become the most vigorously enforced latter-date capital offence, and one in respect 
of which ‘the legislature repeatedly enacted measures to make the prosecution of the crime 
easier and then bring new sorts of forgery under the protection of the capital code’.118 
Handler has noted that Randall McGowen’s work has done much to move historians’ interest 
in forgery away from a rather one dimensional approach which attributes the ‘anomalously 
high number of convicted forgers who were executed’ to ‘a harsh and unthinking reaction to 
the emergence of new economic forms, typical of the era of the so-called Bloody Code. 
Instead, they embrace a more nuanced understanding, exploring the ‘dramatic rise in the 
number of forgery statutes with the financial revolution of the late seventeenth and early 
eighteenth century.119 For Andrew and McGowen ‘forgery touched the lives of the wealthy 
like no other crime’, and it was considered by contemporaries to be an assault upon a man’s 
property, and also his reputation.120  
 
More widely, Handler’s own very learned reflections on forgery have attached much 
significance to how security of the nation and its capacity to sustain war came to be seen as 
dependent on its system of finance. Anxiety about protecting the financial system which thus 
occupied  governments led to the creation of many new and often narrowly-focused forgery 
offences, which were then annexed onto statutes dealing with the revenue and state 
finance. 121  Although Handler argues that there was no apparent pressure from the 
commercial classes, commercial dealings were strongly premised on ‘face to face’ 
encounters, 122  for which forgery represented a species of ‘integrity theft’. As Handler 
continues (very much in the vein of Andrew and McGowen), forgery exposed the 
vulnerability of a financial system built on paper. This, for some, itself amounted to a ‘fraud 
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on the people’ involving government theft of hard-earned wealth and its replacement with 
worthless notes.123  The concerns it engendered linked with deeper ones relating to the 
reliability of exchange and the security of public finance.124 From all these considerations 
Handler persuasively argues that in a world ‘haunted by debt, financial insecurity, and 
ruin...severity was a way of holding one’s fears at bay’.125 Consequently, not only were 
forgers punished more severely than any other type of property offender, but also ‘only 
convicted murderers were less likely to escape the gallows’.126 The ‘enterprise economy’ of 
the nineteenth century would change the culture of commercial transacting manifestly, and 
require extensive rethinking around generating confidence in such dealings with others. But 
even in the context of the threats presented to the safety of property and the value of 
reputation by forgery during the eighteenth century, and its acknowledged growing 
prevalence during the last quarter of it, only very few cases were ever prosecuted in each 
year in the Old Bailey.127 Nevertheless, on account of its perceived seriousness, those who 
were convicted seldom received pardons, and even in the case of those condemned having 
‘powerful connections’, working hard for commutations in sentence, ‘such appeals rarely 
worked’.128  
 
7 Beyond Embezzlement and Forgery: ‘Gigantic Fraud’ and a Sign of 
Things to Come  
It was in the context of forgery that, half a century later, Evans had recalled the mixed 
blessing of liberalising the law relating to it so that it was no longer a capital crime.129 There 
was adulation of this retreat from barbarity, but also shock at how it appeared to have 
unleashed an escalation in financial misconduct. 130  With this, the nature of eighteenth 
century society’s reaction to forgery, and how for many years it was vested with the sanction 
which ‘will ever be regarded with the greatest awe by the multitude’ reveal a Victorian 
consciousness of its own past.131 The same can be said of the South Sea Bubble Scandal 
1719-20, of which it was said in the early years of the twenty-first century that it would tax 
‘the skills of many a more recent fraudster’.132 Its origins are well known, through the creation 
of the South Sea Company in 1710 with exclusive rights to trade in the South Seas and parts 
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of South America being made perpetual in 1712.133 The Company’s flourish in its trade – 
mainly in slaves – was brought to a standstill upon the outbreak of war between Britain and 
Spain in 1718.134 The origins of ‘the financial transaction that laid the foundation of the wild 
speculation…which has made the South Sea Company a byword in history’ arose from the 
arrangement with the home government whereby part of the government’s debt would be 
converted into company stock.135 This symbiosis would allow for simultaneous reduction of 
government debt and increase in the Company’s capital. The success of this scheme in the 
latter regard led to a ‘whole series of speculative bubbles’ inspired by perceptions that this 
could be replicated across other commercial enterprises.136 This climate of wild excitement 
precipitated the Bubble Act 1720 with its latter parts strongly oriented towards stabilising the 
Company. 137  The lengthy and rather rambling legislation set out at some length the 
inconvenience and prejudice to His Majesty and His subjects caused by the frenzy 
generated. In so doing it indicated (rather than actually defining) a number of trade and 
commercial ‘undertakings and projects of different kinds’ causing concern, and which 
pointed to abuse of the corporate form.  
 
The legislation demanded that a number of activities relating to unauthorised seeking of 
public subscription, and false representations of stock transferability, and use of the 
corporate form which had not been authorised (by there being no grant of charter, or through 
utilising obsolete charters) ‘shall be illegal and be deemed public nuisances’ and incurring of 
a penalty.138 The South Sea Bubble was thus the most spectacular of a barrage of scams 
and deceits, and unlike its ‘copycat’ schemes, this one was state-sponsored. The legislation 
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enacted to protect its stability and supremacy (it actually allowed the Company to resume 
trading on the cession of war with Spain) stands as authority that neither the appetite to 
cheat and gull, nor the determination to ensure that nothing ever like the South Sea Bubble 
would happen again, was novel when early-Victorian society encountered ‘high art’ crime. 
Indeed, numerous accounts of the South Sea Bubble were available for contemporary 
consumption in the early part of the nineteenth century. Journalist Charles MacKay’s 
account from 1841 actually listed 86 bubbles declared unlawful by the Bubble Act itself, and 
also reminded his readers that many continued to appear daily ‘in spite of the condemnation 
of the  government and the ridicule of the still sane portion of the public’.139 MacKay’s 
reflections on the lasting significance of this event from the eighteenth century for nineteenth 
century society can also be captured in his remark that a pack of South-Sea playing cards 
was, in 1841, an extremely rare collector’s item.140 Such cards were the work of an ingenious 
card-maker published during the heady days of 1720, where each card contained, alongside 
its usual figure, ‘a caricature of a bubble company, with appropriate verses underneath’.141  
 
8 Gigantic Fraud Predating the Eighteenth Century: The South Sea 
Bubble’s Own Historical Context and a Forecast for the Future 
Furthermore, like MacKay, the architects of the Bubble Act 1720 themselves would have 
been mindful of the tulpenmanie of the Dutch Golden Age when considering appropriate 
responses to the financial destabilisation originating in the scandal surrounding the South 
Sea Company. Certainly by Victorian times there was an awareness of the speculative 
mania for tulip bulbs in early seventeenth-century Holland as actually being the first recorded 
speculative bubble and one with immediate effects which had spread to England, thanks to 
commentaries on tulpenmanie like the one from MacKay published in 1841.142 Following the 
introduction of tulips across Europe during the middle of the sixteenth century, MacKay 
explained that the first root actually arrived in England from Vienna in 1600, but his 
commentary reflects how the ‘rage for possessing them’ which had spread wildly would 
result in ‘preposterous prices’ being paid for the bulbs themselves and would escalate into a 
situation whereby lacking a tulip collection became ‘proof of bad taste in any man of 
fortune’.143 But following an account of how this delicate flower could have become ‘so 
valuable in the eyes of so prudent a people as the Dutch’, MacKay explained that the mania 
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increasingly drew in a vast swathe of persons of very modest means.144 It extended well 
beyond a speculative market for the bulbs themselves in which ‘stock-jobbers’ who ever alert 
to new speculation made use of a variety of means to cause fluctuations in price, and that 
‘many individuals grew suddenly rich’.145  
 
Everyone, including ‘nobles, citizens, farmers, mechanics, seaman, footmen, maidservants, 
even chimney-sweeps and old clotheswomen’ dabbled in tulips. 146  It extended beyond 
Holland as ‘foreigners became smitten with the same frenzy’. Money ‘poured into Holland 
from all directions’, by 1636 regular marts for their sale were established on the Stock 
Exchange of Amsterdam and throughout key towns, and in towns without an exchange 
trading activities became concentrated on the principal tavern.147 This also led to a parallel 
industry of speculations offering land for tulip cultivation emerging alongside the market for 
bulbs themselves.148 From this codes of law became necessary to support the ‘so extensive 
and so intricate’ dynamics of these operations, with this also ensuring that notaries and 
lawyers devoted themselves ‘exclusively to the interests of the trade’, with many towns 
becoming more familiar with their ‘tulip-notary; than their public notary.149 In 1636, tulips 
were publicly sold in the Exchange of London, where London jobbers acted with similar 
resourcefulness and guile as their Dutch counterparts, and at that point MacKay noted that 
‘everyone imagined that the passion for tulips would last forever’ and that the wealthy from 
across Europe would continue to flock to Holland and pay whatever price was asked.150  
 
The following year things would change, when the more prudent Dutch started to see the 
folly could not last and became disinclined to pay rash prices for tulips. As the conviction that 
‘somebody must lose fearfully in the end’ spread, ‘prices fell, and never rose again. 
Confidence was destroyed, and a universal panic seized upon the dealers’. 151  Losses 
amongst those from humbler walks of life were extensive and also wide-spread, with 
merchants ‘reduced to beggary’ and noble houses ‘ruined beyond redemption’.152 Valiant 
attempts were made locally in towns to restore public credit but ultimately these mirrored  
government failure to resolve how the intense gambling frenzy had enabled some to retain 
their profits whilst leaving many others to ‘bear their ruin as philosophically as they 
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could’.153This became readily apparent when the Amsterdam judiciary ruled that ‘debts 
contracted in gambling were no debts in law’. 154 MacKay’s reflections on the continuing 
favour for, and actual value attached to tulips in the upper echelons in English society into 
the nineteenth century shows how the eclipse of the Dutch ‘Golden Age’ had permeated 
English consciousness.155 However, even without this insight the Victorians realised that 
financial impropriety and an appetite for personal gain had been a constant in society since 
‘time immemorial’. Victorian society was itself being assailed by financial misconduct, and 
was acutely aware of deeply troubled times in its past which had also revealed financially 
motivated misconduct, characteristically underpinned by self-interest and secretiveness. 
Thus, much can be said about its reactions during the 1840s to the discovery of ‘high art’ 
crime in the light of this conscious past.  
 
Conclusion 
The discovery of ‘high art’ crime did embody an entirely novel alliance of these age-old 
elements encouraging impropriety with new opportunities, and contemporaries were aware 
that the implications of this could be catastrophic. But the nineteenth-century path to 
criminalisation of what today is likely to be termed ‘financial sector misconduct’, appears to 
have been borne from engagement with the past as well as from living through 
contemporary experiences, and also appears to have been much more moderate and 
composed than it could have been. In these circumstances, Victorian society’s response to 
the onset and progression of ‘high art’ crime could have targeted specifically the more grey 
areas of wrongdoing now being criminalised in the reckless banking offence, across the 
sweep of entrepreneurial activity. But without the benefit of hindsight and in the face of an 
entirely new socio-economic context, its approaches to criminalising financial misconduct 
were measured, whilst also being determined. Armed with understanding of its own past, 
and gripped by the anxiety of unprecedented financial misconduct, it would have been all too 
easy for Victorian society to lose sight of the importance of guarding against making ‘things 
crimes which are not crimes in themselves’.156 
 
The criminal offence of reckless misconduct in the management of a bank currently before 
parliament clearly is intended to apply narrowly, and be enforced exceptionally. As the 
Treasury Consultation noted in 2012, creating a new criminal offence involving recklessness 
would ‘send a very clear signal that society is determined to prevent and deter that conduct’, 
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in a setting where society might have to pay a heavy price for dealing with the consequences 
of recklessness.157 In many respects therefore, the new criminal liability has a value which is 
intended to be principally symbolic. This suggests we are not about to abandon a tradition of 
150 years in requiring financial conduct which is deliberate/intended for fixing criminal 
liability. But in introducing the new misconduct in banking offence we are signaling our 
preparedness to subject those whose risks are deemed to be reckless158 to punishment of 
up to seven years’ imprisonment following conviction on indictment.159 This is a very serious 
step even if it is one which is largely symbolic. Indeed its seriousness can be illuminated 
from Law Commission reflections in 2010 on how recourse to criminal law must be confined 
to ‘serious wrongdoing’.160  The Law Commission did include reckless wrongdoing in its 
references to ‘serious wrongdoing.’161 There is also arguably little difficulty in finding that 
reckless risk-taking involves a ‘harm-related moral failing’ required for criminalisation which 
is appropriate.162 This is perhaps very self-evidently so in the event of collapse of a financial 
institution of ‘vital national importance’. 163  There are acknowledged difficulties which 
criminalising reckless risk-taking by bankers will entail.164 Given this, it would also be wise to 
reflect on the more general message from the Criminal Liability in Regulatory Contexts 
Consultation. Criminalisation is not always appropriate, something which also emphasises 
that particular difficulties can pertain to criminalising misconduct arising in business.165 Thus, 
combining our experiences of living through the global financial crisis with awareness of our 
conscious past, as we have been invited to do by regulators themselves, suggests we 
should welcome this initiative designed to make bankers act more responsibly whilst also 
being mindful of the context in which banking necessarily operates. It also suggests that in 
achieving this we must also be mindful of the conscious past of the society which put our 
tradition of criminal enforcement in place as well as of our own.  
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